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THE DECLINE OF "INFORMED CONSENT"
MARcus L. PLANT*
Introduction
The cause of action identified by the expression "informed consent"
normally involves a claim by a patient or his successor against a physician
or hospital that defendant did not inform plaintiff sufficiently as to certain
aspects of a contemplated medical or surgical procedure. The nondisclo-
sures most frequently alleged relate to the dangers of the proposed proce-
dure or to alternative remedies that might have been pursued.
The action has had an erratic history during the past two decades. Its
popularity began to develop in 1957 following publication of a thoughtful
article by the late Professor Allan H. McCoid of The University of Minne-
sota Law School' and the issuance of the opinion of the California District
Court of Appeals for the First District in Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr.
University Board of Trustees.2 Both McCoid and the California Court rec-
ognized that under certain conditions a physician could be liable to a
patient for failure to disclose sufficient information prior to undertaking
treatment. The general idea was not new; it had been articulated by other
courts much earlier. For example, in 1918 the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, in Hunter v. Burroughs, upheld a claim based on the allegation
"that it is the duty of a physician in the exercise of ordinary care to warn
a patient of the danger of possible bad consequences of using a remedy."3
In the plaintiff-minded milieu that developed in the post World War II era,
the concept experienced an enthusiastic revival. Many actions were
brought4 and a steady stream of commentary flowed into the law reviews.'
Confusion developed as to the specific nature of the cause of action.
Certain early opinions were ambiguous as to whether it was an action for
* Professor of Law, The University of Michigan. B.A. (1932), M.A. (1934), Lawrence
College; J.D. (1938), University of Michigan.
I McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L.
REV. 381, 424 (1957).
2 154 Cal. App.2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
123 Va. 113, 133, 96 S.E. 360, 366 (1918).
See the numerous citations to appellate cases collected in D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, 22.01-22.09 (1960) particularly the 1976 Cumulative Supplement.
Howard Hassard, Legal Counsel for the California Medical Association, attributes the popu-
larity of the informed consent action at least partially to the general development of
"consumerism" in the United States. He indicates that after Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.2d 229,
104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1 (1972), see text accompanying note 45 infra, "[olne thing is
certain and that is that the plaintiff's lawyers will allege lack of informed consent as a routine
matter in future malpractice suits." 119 WESTEaN J. MED. 51-52 (1973).
See, e.g., Plant, An Analysis of "Informed Consent, ", 36 FORDHAM L. Ray. 639 (1968);
Riskin, Informed Consent: Looking For the Action, 1975 U. ILL. L. F. 580; Shartsis, Informed
Consent: Some Problems Revisited, 51 NEB. L. REV. 527 (1972); Waltz & Scheuneman,
Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 628 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Waltz &
Scheuneman]; Comment, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L. Rav. 1396
(1967); Comment, Informed Consent As a Theory of Medical Liability, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 879.
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an unpermitted medical procedure involving trespass or battery, or an
action for negligence involving a violation of the physician's duty to use
due care in treating the patient. The notion that the "new" action
sounded in trespass or battery was appealing to those who saw it as a
means of avoiding the necessity of expert testimony usually required in a
medical negligence case, thereby expanding greatly the possibility of plain-
tiffs' success in medical accident litigation. 7 In 1968 this writer presented
an analysis 8 which attempted to clear away the confusion by distinguishing
between two basically different cases: (1) the relatively rare type of case
in which the physician misrepresents or fails to disclose fully the nature
and character of the surgery or treatment about to be undertaken, in which
case trespass or battery principles are applicable, and (2) the much more
common case in which the physician fails to disclose collateral hazards
attendant upon the surgery or treatment, in which case negligence princi-
ples are pertinent, including the requirement of expert testimony to estab-
lish the physician's violation of duty. Ultimately almost all informed con-
sent cases came to be treated as falling in the negligence area.,
The latter approach was not satisfactory, however, to those whose basic
philosophical orientation is that in all medical accident cases the injured
person should be compensated. From that standpoint an informed consent
action grounded in negligence is "something of a paper tiger" as one writer
put it.'0 Further efforts to expand the scope of the informed consent action
were to be expected. The most potent of these efforts appeared in 1972 in
the case of Canterbury v. Spence, I discussed at greater length below. The
doctrine enunciated in that decision permits the jury to decide the basic
issues in virtually every informed consent case without benefit of expert
testimony. It is the general thesis of this article that the Canterbury doc-
trine is unsound and unwise; that rejection of it, notably by the Supreme
Court of Virginia,'" is well-advised; and that legislative reactions to the
Canterbury approach, such as have emerged in some states, are likely to
curtail the informed consent action to the point of virtual abolition.
I Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354
P.2d 670 (1960); Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11 (1960), aff'd, 360 S.W.2d 673 (Mo.
1962). A detailed discussion of the confusing language used in these opinions appears in Plant,
An Analysis of "Informed Consent, "36 FORDHAM L. REv. 639, 640-48 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Plant].
I Malpractice, 26-27 NACCA L.J. 134-42 (1960-61); Meisel, The Expansion of Liability
for Medical Accidents: From Negligence to Strict Liability By Way of Informed Consent, 56
NEB. L. REv. 51, 74-152 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Meisel].
Plant, supra note 5.
See, e.g., Nishi v. Hartwell, 473 P.2d 116 (Hawaii 1970) (Abe., J. dissenting); Perin v.
Hayne, 210 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1973); Downer v. Veilleux, 332 A.2d 82 (Me. 1974); Belcher v.
Carter, 234 N.E.2d 311, 13 Ohio App.2d 113 (1967); ZeBarth v. Swedish Hospital Medical
Center, 81 Wash.2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972). See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS,
§ 18 at 106 and § 32 at 165 (4th Ed. 1971) (the later cases treat the non-disclosure of risk
cases as involving negligence).
10 See Meisel, supra note 7.
464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).




Defendant surgeon performed a laminectomy"3 on plaintiff. The next
day plaintiff fell out of his hospital bed and thereafter experienced symp-
toms of paralysis below the waist. Defendant immediately performed addi-
tional surgery at the site of the laminectomy. Plaintiff's control over his
muscles improved somewhat after the second operation but nine years
later at the time of trial he still suffered paralysis and functional disability.
Suit was brought against the surgeon and the hospital alleging "several"
causes of action. One was that defendant failed to inform plaintiff of the
danger of paralysis before proceeding with the surgery.
Plaintiff introduced no expert evidence" except that defendant was
called as an adverse witness. He testified he had performed "in excess of
two thousand" laminectomies and that paralysis might be expected in
"somewhere in the nature of one percent" which he termed "a very slight
possibility."' 5 At the close of plaintiffs case defendant's motion for di-
rected verdict was granted."0 The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
for a new trial on the ground, inter alia, that defendant's failure to reveal
the risk of paralysis "made out a prima facie case of violation of the
physician's duty to disclose . ".1.."7 It is evident from the opinion that
this ground for reversal was the most prominent element in the decision
for it occupied seven of ten subdivisions of an elaborate discussion of
twenty and one-half printed pages with 149 footnotes.
Although any attempt to summarize the court's views involves a risk
of doing an injustice to the judges, it is necessary to provide a synopsis of
the principal thesis of the opinion. The court agrees that a physician's
departure from an established professional practice to inform may give rise
to liability to the patient, just as would any other departure from prevail-
ing medical practice that caused injury. It refuses, however, to accept what
it conceives to be the rule that such a departure is the only basis of liability
or that "the patient's cause of action is dependent upon the existence and
non-performance of a relevant professional tradition." Several bases are
presented for objection to this supposed rule. First, the very existence of a
"custom" may be doubtful because of the "myriad of variables" among
patients."8 Second, to bind the obligation to medical usage is to "arrogate"
the decision of proper practice to the physician whereas the standard
should be set by law. 9 Last and most crucial, the question of disclosure
"is oftimes a non-medical judgment" within the scope of ordinary care
rather than within the standard of care applicable to the medical profes-
'3 A surgical procedure in which the posterior arch of a vertebra is removed.
" 464 F.2d at 778.
15 Id.
"1 The trial judge "did not allude specifically to the alleged breach of duty by Dr. Spence
to divulge the possible consequences of the laminectomy." Id. at 779.
17 Id.
," Id. at 784.
It Id.
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sion, ° and "does not bring his [the physician's] medical knowledge and
skills peculiarly into play."2' The court's conclusion is that "the standard
measuring performance of that duty by physicians, as by others, is conduct
which is reasonable under the circumstances. 2 2 Reasonable care requires
disclosure of all risks that are "material" to the patient's decision and what
disclosures fall within the scope of the obligation is to be left to the jury.3
A risk is "material when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows
or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach
significance to the risk in deciding whether to forego the proppsed ther-
apy," 24 taking into account the incidence of injury and the degree of poten-
tial harm.2 It follows that "whenever non-disclosure of particular risk
information is open to debate by reasonable-minded men, the issue is for
the finder of the facts.
'2 6
Two exceptions to the principle are acknowledged. One is the conven-
tional emergency situation in which the patient is unconscious or otherwise
incapacitated and serious danger from failure to treat greatly outweighs
the hazards of treatment. The other is when risk disclosure poses such
threat of psychological detriment to the patient as to be contra-indicated
from a medical point of view. The last mentioned exception, however, must
be "carefully circumscribed," and does not include "the paternalistic no-
tion" that the physician may remain silent simply because divulgence
might prompt the patient to forego therapy that is really needed. The
physician in any event must make disclosure to close relativesY
The concluding remarks of the court reveal its basic philosophy and
purpose.
It is evident that many of the issues typically involved in nondis-
closure cases do not reside peculiarly within the medical domain.
Lay witness testimony can competently establish a physician's
failure to disclose particular risk information, the patient's lack of
knowledge of the risk, and the adverse consequences following the
treatment. Experts are unnecessary to a showing of the materiality
of a risk to a patient's decision on treatment or the reasonably,
expectable effect of risk disclosure on the decision. These conspicu-
ous examples of permissible uses of nonexpert testimony illustrate
the relative freedom of broad areas of the legal problem of risk
nondisclosure from the demands for expert testimony that shackle
plaintiffs' other types of medical malpractice litigation."8
21 Id. at 785.
21 Id.
22 Id.
m Id. at 787.
214 Id., quoting, Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 5, at 640.
2 464 F.2d at 788.
21 Id.
2 Id. at 789.
21 Id. at 792 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
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It seems clear that the court is seeking to eliminate the requirement of
expert testimony on the issue of reasonable care in informed consent cases,
and to give the jury free rein on that question.
Some Weaknesses of Canterbury
It is the writer's view that the decision in Canterbury was in error as
to the manner in which it was reached, the legal principles and authority
on which it was based, and the policy it implemented.
A basic postulate of the adversary system of judicial lawmaking is that
a court confronted with an issue carrying significant societal implications
should decide those issues only after considering thorough arguments, writ-
ten and oral, by opposing counsel.' It is not uncommon for courts to
request briefs amicus curiae if the need exists." It is in this respect that
the judges deciding Canterbury may have made a basic methodological
error. True, the extended opinion had a long period of gestation3 and
evinces considerable study. But the study appears to have been done by
the court sua sponte. Without intending any undue criticism, plaintiffs
brief on appeal contained only five pages of argument and cited only 20
cases, several of which did not have any bearing on informed consent.
Defendant's brief was slightly more extensive, being 22 pages long and
citing 28 judicial authorities and one academic authority. Neither brief
contained anything like a thorough analysis of the informed consent prob-
lem. Nor does the record disclose that any briefs amicus curiae were re-
quested or filed. Even though it be respectfully conceded that the learned
members of the court reached their conclusions only after reflective
thought, such judicial cerebration is simply not an adequate substitute for
well prepared disputation by skillful counsel representing opponents with
substantial interests in the outcome.
The foregoing deficiency in the court's procedure may account for some
of the substantive infirmities of the opinion. An initial flaw lies in the
court's willingness to accept without analysis the generalization that evi-
dence of a medical "custom" binds the jury if defendant has complied with
it. This is a "straw man." It is true that, in the past, some courts have
occasionally used terms such as "custom," or "customary practice," or
"standard practice" in stating the nature of the duty owed by physicians
to patients.12 But it is error to suppose that an alleged custom or standard
z' K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITrON-DECIDING APPEALs, 29-31 (1960).".
the regime of argument renders the deciding also a process oriented partly from without by
analysis, by arrangement of data, and by persuasion: oriented however, not by judicially-
minded helpful consultants but by adversaries to each of whom the tribunal serves either as
an obstacle or as a tool, or, more commonly, as both at once," (emphasis added).
"' See, e.g., Dart v. Pure Oil Co., 233 Minn. 526, 27 N.W.2d 555 (1947), discussed in,
Prosser, Contributory Negligence As Defense to Violation of Statute, 32 MINN. L. REv. 105
(1948); see also Parsonson v. Construction Equip. Co., 386 Mich. 61, 191 N.W.2d 465 (1971).
31 The case was argued in December, 1969 and the decision was not announced until
May, 1972, approximately 30 months later.
32 See, e.g., DiFilippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961) in which the Delaware
19781
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practice cannot be shown by competent evidence to be bad medical prac-
tice. For example, in Naccarato v. Grob3" the issue was whether defen-
dants, two Detroit area pediatricians, breached their duty to the infant
plaintiff by failing to test him for phenylkentonuria (PKU), a rare but
potentially devastating childhood disease. Three Detroit pediatricians tes-
tified that it was the practice in that area to test for PKU only when certain
symptoms were observed but not to test every infant for the disease. Their
testimony was to the effect that defendants did not vary from the usual
"standard of care" of pediatricians in the Detroit area. 4 Despite this evi-
dence, testimony of two experts from other parts of the country was admit-
ted to show that this "custom" was improper medical practice, and that
every infant should be tested as a routine procedure. It was held that a jury
question was presented as to whether defendants had failed to meet their
legal duty as physicians.
Whether a "custom" does or does not exist, the ultimate issue always
is whether defendant's conduct constituted proper medical practice in the
specific circumstances of the case before the court. Indeed, a customary
practice may be so obviously wrong as to be held negligent as a matter of
law. An impressive illustration may be found in Helling v. Carey3 in which
the Washington Supreme Court ruled that defendant was negligent even
though he had followed a practice accepted as proper by the entire body
of opthamologists in the country."6
It is submitted that the court in Canterbury was in error insofar as it
rested its opinion on the notion that medical custom always binds the
factfinder and thus "arrogates" the decision in medical negligence cases
to the medical profession.
Perhaps the most glaring weakness of Canterbury relates to its concept
that the decision as to risk disclosure is a non-medical one and can be
appraised by a jury without the aid of, or in opposition to, expert evidence.
In the first place the "authority" cited in support of this proposition is
extremely questionable.
. The idea seems to have had its origin in a 1962 student note in the
"Recent Cases" section of the HARVARD LAW RmEIEw. 7 In that discussion
the student writer nonchalantly asserts: "Such a decision (i.e. to disclose
or not) does not call for expertise significantly different from that usually
attributed to court and jury, and the judgment appears to be one properly
Supreme Court distorted legal doctrine by interpreting a general failure of Wilmington sur-
geons to warn of a certain hazard as a "custom" not to do so. The idea properly drew criticism
in a note at 75 HARv. L. Rav. 1445 (1962).
3 384 Mich. 248, 180 N.W.2d 788 (1970).
4 Id. at 252, 180 N.W.2d at 790.
3 83 Wash.2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
"' The case resembled Naccarato in some respects. The practice or "custom" was that a
patient under 40 years of age was not tested for glaucoma unless certain symptoms were
observed. In view of the severity of the hazard and the simplicity of the test, the court held
the practice to be negligent as a matter of law and reversed judgment for defendant.
3 Note, 75 HARV. L. Rav. 1445 (1962).
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left within the traditional decisional process. ' 3 No judicial or other au-
thority is cited; it is simply the writer's ipse dixit.
In 1967 the notion was repeated in the student comment in the
CAUFORNIA LAw REVIEW. 3 There the writer makes the following statements:
it is submitted, however, that in the absence of established cus-
tom, a jury can set a standard just as well as an interested expert
witness." A jury, unlike an expert witness, feels no reluctance to
criticize a fellow physician. Specialized knowledge is not required
to determine which risks are relevant in deciding whether or not
to submit to an operation. Since neither the jury nor the court is
motivated by professional self interest, they are more likely than
an interested expert witness to reach a reasonable conclusion about
the duty to disclose."
The closest approach to an authoritative endorsement of these views
appears in an article by Waltz and Scheuneman.12 The thesis is treated
more elaborately but no judicial authority is cited. The weight of the
sentiment is raised from student writing to faculty writing.
It may seem graceless for a faculty person to express skepticism for
"academic" authority. In this instance, however, it must be noted that not
only was there no medical or judicial opinion supporting the viewpoint
expressed by these writers but their approach had been rejected and an
exactly opposite point of view taken by the Missouri Supreme Court as
early as 1965 in a leading case in the field.4" That court wrote:
The question is not what, regarding the risks involved, the juror
would relate to the patient under the same or similar circumstan-
ces, or even what a reasonable man would relate, but what a rea-
sonable medical practitioner would do. Such practitioner would
consider the state of the patient's health, the condition of his heart
and nervous system, his mental state, and would take into ac-
count, among other things, whether the risks involved were mere
remote possibilities or something which occurred with some sort of
frequency or regularity. This determination involves medical
judgment as to whether disclosure of possible risks may have such
an adverse effect on the patient as to jeopardize success of the
proposed therapy, no matter how expertly performed. . . . After
a consideration of these and other proper factors, a reasonable
medical practitioner, under some circumstances, would make full
u Id. at 1447.
Comment, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1396 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Informed Consent].
1' The "interest" the writer ascribes to a medical expert is the general antagonism said
to be felt by all doctors to medical malpractice lawsuits.
" Informed Consent, supra note 36, at 1405.
42 Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 5.
'3 Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1965).
1978]-
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disclosure of all risk which had any reasonable likelihood of occur-
ring, but in others the facts and circumstances would dictate a
guarded or limited disclosure. In some cases the judgment would
be less difficult than in others, but in any event, it would be a
medical judgment.44
Neither in the Canterbury opinion nor in the writings upon which it
relies so heavily is there an answer to the Missouri Supreme Court, other
than unsupported contrary statements. Perhaps the position of the Mis-
souri court was overlooked. The same failure is generally true of those
courts that have followed Canterbury,45 except in Wisconsin, where a ma-
jority of the Supreme Court implemented Canterbury's doctrine in Scaria
v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.4" Justice Hansen, in a vigorous dissent,
wrote:
Children play at the game of being doctor but judges and juries
ought not . . . . [Tihe added hairshirt of the average man tests,
here placed [by Canterbury and Scaria] on the backs of the medi-
cal profession, is placed, in malpractice lawsuits, on no other pro-
fessional group.4"
One of the most impressive statements on the subject was issued by the
" Id. at 674-75 (part of emphasis added).
,5 Some courts have expressly approved Canterbury's principles and indicated that they
would follow them. Sawyer v. Methodist Hosp., 522 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1975) (dictum express-
ing doubt that proof of prevailing medical practice is required by Tennessee law in every
case); Bower v. Garfield, 382 F. Supp. 503 (D. Pa. 1974), citing, Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa.
Super, Ct. 260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971), affd without opinion, 503 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1974);
Riedinger v. Colburn, 361 F. Supp. 1073 (D. Idaho 1973) (applying principles for procedures
"not common," but seemingly measuring the obligation by the practice of physicians in the
community); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 2d 229, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1 (1972) (limited
adoption); Martin v. Brallian, 36 Colo. App. 254, 540 P.2d 1118 (1975); Cosgrove v. Holmes,
37 Ohio Misc. 95, 308 N.E.2d 765 (1973) (trial court dictum); Martin v. Stratton, 515 P.2d
1366 (Okla. 1973) (dictum); Holland v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 270 Ore. 129, 522 P.2d
208, opinion withdrawn for failure of plaintiff to except to erroneous instruction, 526 P.2d 577
(1974); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 1606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972); Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash.
App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974), aff'd, 530 P.2d 334 (1975); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 78 Wis. 2d
596, 207 N.W.2d 297 (1973) (dictum).
A number of courts have adhered to their position requiring expert medical testimony
but it is not clear from the opinions that the Canterbury doctrine was expressly urged upon
them. Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974) (applying Texas law); Riedisser v. Nelson,
111 Ariz. 542, 534 P.2d 1052 (1975); Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Sup. 1974);
Charley v. Camerson, 215 Kan. 750, 528 P.2d 1205 (1974); Murchiewicz v. Stanton, 50 Mich.
App. 344, 213 N.W.2d 317 (1973); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
In some states there appears to be complete confusion: New York is the best example.
See Abril v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 364 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1975); Fogal v. Genessee Hospital,
41 App. Div.2d 468, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1973). Two courts have expressly rejected Canterbury
when it was urged upon them. Butler v. Berkeley, 25 N.C. App. 325, 213 S.E.2d 571 (1975);
Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 222 S.E.2d 783 (1976). See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra;
see generally, Annot. 52 A.L.R.3d 1084 (1973).
,' 68 Wis.2d 1, 227 N.W.2d 647 (1975).
" Id. at 24-25, 227 N.W.2d at 659-60.
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Virginia Supreme Court in Bly v. Rhoads" when it was urged to adopt the
"modern trend" represented by Canterbury. In declining to take that
course, the court wrote:
The matters involved in the disclosure syndrome, more often than
not, are complicated and highly technical. To leave the establish-
ment of such matters to lay witnesses, in our opinion, would pose
dangers and disadvantages which far outweigh the benefits and
advantages a "modern trend" rule would bestow upon patient-
plaintiffs. In effect, the relaxed "modern trend" rule permits lay
witnesses to express, when all is said and done, what amounts to
medical opinion. Undoubtedly, such a rule would cause further
proliferation of medical malpractice actions in a situation already
approaching a national crisis. This is a result which, if at all possi-
ble consonant with sound judicial policy, should be avoided.49
In addition to authoritative and theoretical weaknesses, the
Canterbury doctrine has mischievous practical implications. Its most un-
settling result is that it compounds enormously the uncertainty that has
always bedeviled this area of law.50 This vagueness can appear at several
levels. For example, how will a lawyer who is consulted by a physician
advise his client as to what to disclose in a specific case? Suppose he tells
the physician that he must make all disclosures that "a reasonable person,
in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient's position,
would be likely to attach significance . . .in deciding whether or not to
forego the proposed therapy." 5' Can it be thought that this will be mean-
ingful to any person unaccustomed to thinking in broad legal concepts?
When the lawyer adds that the physician's effort to comply with this
obscure standard is subject to later review by a jury of laymen who are free
to disregard any expert evidence he may produce, the physician's distress
will be understandable.
As an illustration, take the facts in Cobbs v. Grant," one of Canter-
bury's followers, at least in part. Plaintiff, having undergone surgery
for a duodenal ulcer, had to endure three successive subsequent agonies
11 216 Va. 645, 222 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1976).
' Id.
5' The unhappiness of the medical profession with the informed consent doctrine because
of its uncertainty has been expressed often. Richard P. Bergen, Esq., of the American Medical
Association Legal Department has written: "A physician seeking specific guidance on what
information he should give a patient to obtain 'informed consent' for a particular medical
or surgical procedure is confronted by legal confusion." 229 A. M. A. J. 325 (July 15, 1974).
Eugene G. Laforet, M.D., writes: "Informed consent is a legalistic fiction that destroys good
patient care and paralyzes the conscientious physician .... The term has no place in the
lexicon of medicine." 234 A.M.A.J. 1579-84 (April 12, 1976). See also Kaplan, Greenwald &
Rogers, all M.D.'s, of Veterans Administration Hospital, Miami, Florida, 296 NEw ENG. J.
MED. (May 12, 1977).
51 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
512 8 Cal. 2d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
19781
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(spleen removal, gastric ulcer, and premature suture absorption). It
would be interesting to have the members of the California Supreme Court
who signed that opinion, or the judges in Canterbury, write out the advice
they would have given to the surgeon prior to the original procedure de-
scribing his duty to disclose the hazards that later materialized, and to
guide him in such a way that a subsequent jury could not find against him.
It is one thing to formulate a verbally attractive rule of law in the quiet
of an academic cloister or a judicial chamber; it is another thing for a
practicing lawyer to make that rule of law function; and it is still quite
another thing for a physician, not versed in the subtleties of the law and
its ways, to live and work under it with any reasonable degree of security.
It has been written by a widely respected legal philosopher that the "inner
morality" of the Anglo-American legal system is that the rules of law
promulgated by judges and legislatures to meet specific problems should
be workable and administrable. 3
Consider another area of uncertainty spawned by Canterbury-
variation in jury verdicts. Assume two unrelated cases involving the
same set of medical facts in which each surgeon fails to disclose the same
hazard. The patient in each case is injured by that hazard. Assume
further that the cases are tried to different juries, and that the same
expert evidence is adduced in each case to the effect that each surgeon
followed proper medical practice. One jury finds its defendant-surgeon
liable; the other jury finds its defendant-surgeon not liable. A law
oriented person is familiar with inconsistent jury verdicts and can live in
relative intellectual comfort with them. But it is difficult to explain this
to a physician, particularly when she or he must guide professional conduct
in light of the jury's ultimate control. It is doubtful that any amount of
theoretical argument can persuade a non-lawyer of the fairness or sound-
ness of a rule of law that can bring such results.
A similar situation could develop with a time variable. For example,
in 1977, a jury decides that a physician should not be held liable for failure
to disclose hazard A in preparing for procedure B. In 1978, in the same
county, another jury, having heard the identical expert evidence, holds
that another physician should be held liable for failing to disclose hazard
A in preparation for procedure B.
As one reflects on these aspects of the problem, there come to mind
the words of Judge Cardozo:
The hazards of a business [profession] conducted on these terms
are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist
in the implication of a duty that exposes to these consequences.54
51 "The demands of the inner morality of law ... are, as we loosely say, affirmative in
nature: . . . make the law. . . coherent and clear." L. FULLER, THE MORALrry OF LAW, (1964)
at 42; see also, Aigler, Legislation in Vague and General Terms, 21 MICH. L. REV. 831 (1923).




If a segment of any profession conducts its activities in a manner unac-
ceptable to society, the legislature is likely to intervene. The medical pro-
fession has occasionally undergone this experience. For example, in 1965
Michigan's legislature enacted a statute that requires that every newborn
child be tested for phenylketonuria (PKU).5 It is likely that the legislation
was prompted by the revelation as a result of certain litigation58 that De-
troit pediatricians did not test for PKU until specific symptoms mani-
fested themselves, whereas in other areas of the country the test was given
routinely to all newborn children.
Similarly, if the courts embark on decisional paths that expose the
medical profession to uncertain or fortuitous liability, or to an unaccepta-
ble degree of liability, ofie possible social reaction is legislative interven-
tion. An example of this sequence seems to have occurred in Alaska in
1967, when that legislature eliminated the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in
medical malpractice cases57 after a Supreme Court decision had demon-
strated an alarming use of the principle. 5 A comparable course of events
occurred in Michigan. In 1971 the Supreme Court issued an opinion that
seemed to expand greatly the liability of a physician for breach of contract
to cure without any showing of negligence.59 The legislature promptly
amended the statute of frauds to require that any such alleged promise to
cure be in a writing signed by the promisor."
While one can never be entirely certain what stirs legislatures to action,
it is true that recent legislative intervention seems to be proceeding rapidly
in the area of informed consent. In the period between April, 1975 and
December, 1976, twenty-one state legislatures enacted some kind of statute
on the subject.8 ' Undoubtedly the so-called "crisis" in medical malpractice
in 1975 provided a legislative climate that rendered these enactments more
likely. An interested observer might infer from the nature of the new stat-
utes, however, that dissatisfaction with the Canterbury doctrine had a
major influence.
Not all of these statutes have been available to the writer for the prepa-
ration of this article. Even as to those available, it would prolong the
discussion unduly to offer an analysis of all. The following, therefore, is a
summary of several selected enactments exemplifying different ap-
proaches.
MICH. Corp. LAWS ANN. § 325.321 (1975).
56 See Naccarato v. Grob, 12 Mich. App. 130, 162 N.W.2d 305 (1968), rev'd, 384 Mich.
248, 180 N.W.2d 788 (1970). See also text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
57 ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.540 (1967).
" Patrick v. Sedwick, 391 P.2d 453 (Alas. 1964).
Guilmet v. Campbell, 385 Mich. 57, 188 N.W.2d 601 (1971).
1974 Mich. Pub. Acts 343, amending, MICH. Com'p. LAWS ANN. § 566.10. This reaction
against an unwise court decision (or dictum) was probably as extreme and unfortunate as
some of those discussed below relating to informed consent. The statute seems now to open
a broad path for unscrupulous charlatans.
, 1 MALPRACMCE CLAIMS, NATONAL Assoc. OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 136 (May 1977).
1978]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
In New York 2 the statute is designated expressly as a "limitation" of
the medical malpractice action based on informed consent. The opening
section defines lack of informed consent as failure "to disclose . . .the
reasonably forseeable risks and benefits involved as a reasonable medical
practitioner under similar circumstances would have disclosed ..
(Emphasis supplied). The action is allowed only in cases involving non-
emergency treatment or a diagnostic procedure requiring invasion or dis-
ruption of the integrity of the body. Several defenses are expressly spelled
out, including common knowledge of the risk, patient's expressed willing-
ness to go forward regardless of the risk, impossibility of procuring consent,
and medical inadvisability of disclosure. It is plain that the legislative
purpose is to circumscribe the cause of action, abolish the Canterbury
doctrine, 3 prescribe a medically determined standard in each case and, as
a necessary corollary, reinstate the requirement of expert testimony as to
whether defendant violated the standard.
Another approach followed by several states, is exemplified by the Iowa
statute. 4 It provides for "a presumption that informed consent was given"
if the consent is written, signed, and sets forth in general terms (a) the
nature and purpose of the procedure or procedures, (b) the known risk, if
any, of six specific hazards-death, brain damage, quadriplegia, paraple-
gia, loss or loss of function of any organ or limb, and disfiguring
scars-with the probability of each such risk if reasonably determinable,
and (c) acknowledges disclosure of the above information and states that
all questions about the procedure have been answered satisfactorily. Ob-
viously, the Iowa legislature is seeking to bring more certainty to the physi-
cian's obligation of risk disclosure. Although the statutory "presumption"
is not likely to be construed as a conclusive one, the burden of overcoming
the presumption will be on the patient.
Florida has pursued this approach even further enacting a statute,'
which creates a conclusive presumption of validity if the written consent
meets the statutory requirements, unless there is "a fraudulent misrepre-
sentation of a material fact in obtaining the signature." The statutory
requirements are that (a) the physician's conduct in obtaining the consent
was "in accordance with an accepted standard of medical practice among
members of the medical profession with similar training and experience in
the same or similar medical community"; and (b) from the information so
provided by the physician a reasonable individual "would have a general
understanding of the procedure and medically acceptable alternative pro-
cedures or treatments and substantial risks and hazards inherent in the
proposed treatment or procedures which are recognized among other physi-
62 1975 N.Y. Laws Ch. 109.
61 The Canterbury opinion had been referred to approvingly in Fogal v. Gennesee Hospi-
tal, 41 App. Div.2d 468, 344 N.Y.S.2d, 552, 559 (1973).
" IOWA CODE ANN. § 147-37 (West Supp. 1976). A somewhat similar statute was enacted
in Louisiana and appears at LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40.1299.40 (West Supp. 1976).
11 Florida Medical Consent Law, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.46 (West Supp. 1976).
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cians. . in the same or similar community who performed similar treat-
ments or procedures"; or (c) "The patient would reasonably, under all the
surrounding circumstances, have undergone such treatment or procedure
had he been advised by the physician. . . in accordance with the provi-
sions" mentioned above. (Emphasis supplied).
The underscored terms seem to establish the so-called "locality" stan-
dard both as to specialists and general practitioners. Expert testimony will
surely be needed to establish a departure from the standard. Apart from
fraud, compliance with the statutory requirements insulates the physician
from an informed consent suit because the presumption is conclusive. It
is therefore unlikely that there will be many informed consent cases in
Florida in the future.
An even more elaborate statute has been enacted in Ohio.6" That stat-
ute provides that a written consent that fulfills the statutory requirements
shall be presumed to be valid and effective in the absence of proof "by a
preponderance of the evidence" that the one procuring the consent was not
acting in good faith, or that the consent was induced by fraudulent misre-
presentation, or that the signer was not able to communicate effectively
in English or the language in which consent is written. Furthermore the
statute directs that, "[E]xcept as herein provided, no evidence shall be
admissible to impeach, modify, or limit the authorization for performance
of the procedure or procedures set forth in such written consent." As in
Iowa the Ohio statute enumerates six hazards to be disclosed-death,
brain damage, quadriplegia, paraplegia, loss of function of any organ or
limb, or disfiguring scars-together with "the probability of each such risk
if reasonably determinable." The consent must acknowledge that such
disclosure of information has been made and that all questions have been
answered satisfactorily. In addition, the statute sets out a consent form
which is required to be in ten-point type with certain bold-face or large-
print statements. The form breaks down the risks into nine categories
including loss of organs, loss of an arm or leg, and loss of function of an
arm or leg. Furthermore, the consent signature must be witnessed. Finally,
a somewhat puzzling provision requires that "[A]ny use of the consent
form stated [in the statute] has no effect on the common law rights and
liabilities, including the right of a physician to obtain the oral or implied
consent of a patient to a medical procedure that may exist as between
physicians and patients at the time this section is enacted."87 Similar
statutes codifying the locality doctrine have also been enacted in Idaho,"5
" OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.54 (Page Supp. 1976).
'7 Id. Just what is meant by this provision of the statute is not at all clear. It is probably
intended to mean that even though the statute is not complied with, and the presumption
set forth therein is not created, a physician might still defend on the ground that he procured
oral or other consent which is valid and effective. If it means that the cause of action for
informed consent shall continue to exist as it did before the statute was enacted, the enact-
ment of the statute would be a pointless act and the legislature has obliterated what it
intended to do. The latter construction certainly should not be reached.
I Medical Malpractice Cases Act, H.B. No. 478, § 2, 1976 Idaho Sess. Laws 951. The
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Nebraska 9 and Tennessee."
Pennsylvania is the only state known to the writer in which the new
statutory language on informed consent seems to follow the doctrine of
Canterbury. The Pennsylvania statute requires the physician to inform the
patient "of the nature of the proposed procedure or treatment and of those
risks and alternatives to treatment or diagnosis that a reasonable patient
would consider material to the decision whether or not to undergo treat-
ment or diagnosis," except in cases of emergency and therapeutic inadvisa-
bility.7'
Conclusion
In 1954 Melvin M. Belli published his "Modern Trials."72 The following
year it was reviewed by the late William L. Prosser.1 Included in his
appraisal was the following thought:
This book frightens me. It doth harrow up my soul, make by two
eyes, like stars, start from their spheres, and cause my knotted and
combined locks to part, and each particular hair to stand on end
like quills upon the fretful porcupine. 4
Dean Prosser's distress was understandable. He envisioned that full
exploitation of the techniques described by Belli would intensify criticism
of the jury trial system in tort cases in the United States and furnish
additional ammunition to those who advocated its curtailment or aboli-
tion. For Prosser realized, as any thoughtful observer must, that if the
adjudicative process is abused and distorted (whether by a specialized
segment of the Bar or by a permissive judiciary or both) then to the extent
that its results are unacceptable to those who are to be governed by it, the
statute contains a sweeping provision that in any malpractice case plaintiff "must, as an
essential part of his or her case in chief, affirmatively prove by direct expert testimony and
by a preponderance of all the competent evidence, that such defendant then and there
negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice of the community
in which such care allegedly was or should have been provided .. " Another subsection
describes restrictive requirements for an expert. The statute seems not only to cover informed
consent cases but would also apparently eliminate res ipsa loquitur.
89 Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act, Leg. Bill No. 434, § 16, 1976 Neb. Laws 151.
It provides that informed consent means "consent to a procedure based on information which
would ordinarily be provided to the patient under like circumstances by health care providers
engaged in a similar practice in the locality or in similar localities."
70 TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3417 (Supp. 1976). The doctrine is made applicable to special-
ists. The statute requires the plaintiff to prove "that the defendant did not supply appropriate
information to the patient in obtaining his informed consent (to the procedure out of which
plaintiff's claim allegedly arose) in accordance with the recognized standard of acceptable
professional practice in the profession and in the specialty, if any, that the defendant prac-
tices in the community in which he practices and in similar communities."
' Health Care Services Malpractice Act, Act. No. 111, Art. 1, § 103, 1975 Pa. Laws 390.
" M. BELLI, MODERN TRiALs (1954).
Prosser, Book Review, 43 CALIF. L. Rxv. 556 (1955).
7' Id.; cf. W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, Act I, Scene V.
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system will be corrected and may be over-corrected. Long ago that oc-
curred with the abolition of the cause of action for breach of contract to
marry-the so-called "anti-heart balm" statutes. 75 More recently it has
occurred in a number of states with the adoption of no-fault compensation
systems for automobile accidents. Furthermore, there are currently some
signs that this kind of "reform" is likely to be initiated in the area of
products liability, with a view to curtailing or eliminating the numerous
causes of action that have developed in that area .
7
The foregoing sampling of recent statutes relating to informed consent
reveals a comparable trend. The cause of action based on lack of informed
consent is being drastically limited and, in some states such as Florida and
Ohio it has been virtually abolished. To some observers, including the
writer, this turn of affairs is a matter for regret. Apart from the Canterbury
aberration, the action is generally sound in theory, relatively effective in
practice, and not unduly burdensome on the medical profession. In states
subscribing to the Canterbury doctrine, however, the situation is less than
tolerable and the emergence of statutory "reform" is thus not surprising,
especially when the class affected is as well organized, articulate, and
politically potent as are most state medical societies. The unfortunate
result is that in those states with "reform" legislation relief will now be
available only in the most egregious cases. In jurisdictions which have not
joined the statutory trend it is likely that pressure will develop to do so,
particularly if their appellate courts begin to enlarge the cause of action
in the Canterbury manner. Ironically, these restrictions on the cause of
action for the lack of informed consent do not flow from the theoretical
attacks on the tort system by its critics, but from abuses of the system by
its friends.
" See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2910 (West 1968) (originally adopted 1935 Mich.
Pub. Act. No. 127); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 80-a (McKinney 1976) (as applied in Sulkowski
v. Szewczyk, 255 App. Div. 103, 6 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1938) in which the court sets forth the
legislative findings of abuse); Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm", 33 MICH. L.
REv. 979 (1933).
1' In 1976 a Federal Interagency Task Force, chaired by the Undersecretary of Commerce,
was created to study all aspects of the products liability problem. In Michigan, bills have
been introduced in the 1977 Legislature (HB 4937, HB 5687) that would, among other things,
place schedule limits on awards for pain and suffering; eliminate allowance of punitive dam-
ages under guise of compensatory damages; require the trial to be held in two stages (liability
and damages); require plaintiff's attorney to file an affidavit that the case was not solicited;
limit manufacturer's duty to warn; abolish the collateral source rule; set a specific statute of
limitations; and expressly provide for certain defenses such as alteration, conformity to gov-
ernment standards, "state of the art", etc.; and control terms of insurance company settle-
ments. The bills are now in the Committee on Economic Development. The State Bar of
Michigan has had a special task force at work on products liability for some time.
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